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Although the court did not emphasize congressional intent, the decision is
sound because the defendant's rules were designed specifically to circumvent the NEPA's requirements73* If federal agencies were permitted to trod
unshackled over federal environmental legislation, the moral if not the
legal underpinning of legislation aimed at privately caused environmental
damage would disappear. 74
RICHARD NIELSEN

CIVIL PROCEDURE: JOINDER OF LIABILITY
INSURERS - A WELCOME CLARIFICATION OF
SHINGLETON AND BETA ETA
Stecher v. Pomeroy, 253 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1971)
Plaintiffs sued the owner-operator of a vehicle and the owners' insurer
for injuries sustained in a collision. Although the policy limits of $100,000/
$300,000 were mentioned to the jury the trial court refused to give requested
instructions to disregard this information, and a verdict was returned for
$19,000. The judgment was affirmed by the Fourth District Court of Appeal
of Florida, which determined that admission of the existence and extent
of insurance coverage was harmless error when the insured admitted negligence and when the nature and extent of the plaintiff's injuries sustained
the amount of the verdict.' The appellants alleged conflict between Beta
Eta House Corp. v. Gregory2 and Shingleton v. Bussey3 concerning the
propriety of refusing requested instructions to disregard mention of insurance
limits, and whether such error, if any, was harmless. On certiorari* the
73. 449 F.2d at 1116-19.
74. Recently there has been a move to legislatively override the instant decision. An
amendment to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act would permit a licensing agency
to rely on the water quality standards of other federal agencies and thus would not be
required

to

examine

CONSERVATION REPORT,

any

problem

of water

quality.

NATIONAL

WILDLIFE

FEDERATION.

63-65 (March 3, 1972).

1. Stecher v. Pomeroy, 244 So. 2d 488 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1971). The contention on appeal
was that the defendants were deprived of a fair trial by the trial court: (1) informing
the jury that the liability insurer was a party defendant; (2) permitting plaintiffs to
publish to the jury answers to the interrogatories disclosing the existence and extent of
liability insurance coverage; and (3) refusing to instruct the jury to ignore the existence
of insurance coverage.
2. 237 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1970).
3. 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969).
4. According to the court, the conflict asserted was not primarily founded upon the
basic holdings in Beta Eta and Shingleton regarding the propriety of granting severance.
Concluding that the question of severance continues to trouble the trial courts, however, the instant court attempted to clarify this question, apparently through dicta. 253 So.
2d 421 (Fla. 1971).
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Supreme Court of Florida dismissed the appeal 5 and HELD, policy liability
limits should not be mentioned to the jury, and if such mention is made
the jury should be instructed to disregard it. Finding no adverse effect upon
the jury's verdict, however, the court held the mention of liability limits
to be harmless error.
Prior to Shingleton v. Bussey6 a liability insurer could not be joined in
an action against the insured tortfeasor.7 Reference to the existence of insurance coverage was excluded from trial because juries might be more
prone to find negligence or to augment damages if they felt that an affluent
institution would bear the loss.8 Shingleton, however, established that a
plaintiff, as a third-party beneficiary to an automobile liability policy, had a
direct cause of action against the insurer and could join the insurer as
party-defendant 9
Confusion subsequently arose concerning the extent that Shingleton
overruled former cases 0 prohibiting the disclosure of the existence and extent
of insurance at trial." While the Shingleton court did not totally discredit
the argument that disclosure might prejudice the insurer, it concluded in
dictum that modern juries are more mature. Accordingly, "a candid admission at trial"' 2 of both the existence and extent of insurance coverage
would diminish the insurer's over-all policy judgment payments more than
the non-disclosure approach, which "may often mislead juries to think
insurance coverage is greater than it is." 3 Moreover, the court suggested that
joinder would facilitate resolution of all interrelated issues and preserve the
parties' interests in expeditious litigation of their claims.-x Thus, while the
main thrust of Shingleton was to establish procedural joinder of liability
insurers, the court dearly contemplated the disclosure of insurance at trial.
Although the language in Shingleton suggests that both the existence of
coverage and the liability limits should be disclosed at trial, it was not so
interpreted in Beta Eta House Corp. v. Gregory.15 In Beta Eta the court

5.

The court concluded that the alleged conffict necessary for certiorari jurisdiction,

FLA. CONsT. art. V, §4 (2), was not present. 253 So. 2d at 422.

6. 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969).
7. Artille v. Davidson, 126 Fla. 219, 170 So. 707 (1936).
8. See, e.g., Carls Markets, Inc. v. Meyer, 69 So. 2d 789, 793 (Fla. 1953).
9. 223 So. 2d 713, 715 (Fla. 1969). Although this decision involved automobile liability
contracts, subsequent cases have extended joinder to other forms of liability insurance.
See, e.g., Pyles v. Bridges, 239 So. 2d 278 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1970) (medical malpractice insurance); Beta Eta House Corp. v. Gregory, 237 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1970) (premises liability
insurance); Ray v. Pfeiffer, 237 So. 2d 562 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1970) (homeowner liability
insurance).
10. See, e.g., Carls Markets, Inc. v. Meyer, 69 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1953).
11. See Comment, Judicial Creation of Direct Action Against Automobile Liabiblity
Insurers, 22 U. FLA. L. Rav. 145, 148 (1969). For a general discussion of the questions
created by the judicial provision for direct action see Williams, Shingleton v. Bussey
Doctrine: To Join or Not To Join-This Is the Question, 37 INs. COUNSEL J. 418 (1970).
12. Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713, 718 (Fla. 1969).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 719-20.
15. 237 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1970).
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concluded that the purpose of Shingleton was to require disclosure in discovery proceedings, settlement negotiations, and pretrial hearings.'1 6 Without
any supporting discussion the Beta Eta court stated that the existence and
amount of insurance coverage have no bearing on the issues of liability and
damages, and such evidence should not be considered by the jury.,7 Thus,
Beta Eta indicates that prior case law prohibiting disclosure at trial was not
overruled by Shingleton.
The Beta Eta and Shingleton decisions, in addition to differing as to the
propriety of disclosure, apparently conflicted on the issue of severance.
Although Beta Eta reaffirmed joinder of liability insurers, the court held
that the trial judge "may," in his discretion, order a separate trial on the
issue of coverage' 8 pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.270 (b). 19
In Shingleton, however, the court had stated that if joinder resulted in
unduly complicated issues between the insured and the insurer, the trial
judge could sever such issues for a separate adjudication.2 0 The implication
was that absent such complicating issues there would be no basis for severance.
While the Beta Eta decision relegated severance to the discretion of the
trial court, the majority provided no guidelines for the exercise of
this discretion. 21 Possible confusion as to the meaning of Beta Eta is readily
apparent, since Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.270 (b) permits severance
of parties "in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice." 22 On the
basis of the statement in Beta Eta that the jury should not consider the
existence of insurance, a trial judge might feel that joinder of an insurer
would necessarily prejudice the jury. Therefore, a plausible interpretation
of Beta Eta is that it created an absolute right to severance in liability
insurers.

16. Id. at 165.
17. Id.
18. Beta Eta House Corp. v. Gregory, 237 So. 2d 163, 165 (Fla. 1970). In so holding,
the court modified the lower court's formulation in Beta Eta House Corp. v. Gregory, 230
So. 2d 495, 500 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1970), that the trial judge "should," on the motion of
either party, order severance in order to exclude any reference to insurance from the
trial. In Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Clonts, 248 So. 2d 511, 512 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1971), the court
interpreted this modification to mean that the supreme court intended to restore to the
trial court whatever measure of discretion the lower appellate court had purported to
remove. But see Beta Eta House Corp. v. Gregory, 237 So. 2d 163, 166, 167 (Fla. 1970)
(Boyd, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Boyd concluded that the
majority had affirmed the effect of the lower court's formulation requiring automatic
severance absent extraordinary circumstances, and thereby reversed the remedial aspects
of Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969).
19. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.270(b) provides in part: "The court in furtherance of convenience
or to avoid prejudice may order a separate trial of any claim . . . or of any separate
issue ...."
20. 223 So. 2d 713, 720 (Fla. 1969).
21. For a discussion of the resulting confusion relating to the exercise of judicial discretion on a motion for severance see Kratz v. Newsom, 251 So. 2d 539 (2d D.C.A. Fla.

1971).
22.

FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.270 (b).
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The apparent conflict between Beta Eta and Shingleton, regarding disclosure at trial and severance, has produced much confusion in the lower
courts. In Utica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Clonts23 the court held that the
denial of the insurer's motion for severance was an abuse of discretion. Although agreeing that the mention of insurance at trial was no longer prejudicial as a matter of law, the court emphasized that disclosure nevertheless
involved a risk of prejudice. Stressing the difficulty of determining whether
the injection of liability insurance would be prejudicial in a particular trial,
the court concluded that a ruling on severance should be guided by the
relevance of insurance to the triable issues remaining in the case. 2' Relying
on Beta Eta, the court decided that insurance was irrelevant in Utica, since
it was determined at pretrial conference that the sole triable issues were
negligence and damages. 25 Therefore, since disclosure of insurance coverage
at trial always involves risk of prejudice, it was an abuse of discretion, when
28
insurance was irrelevant, to deny a motion for severance.
27
In Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Myers the same court affirmed
the denial of insurer's motion for severance, noting that the insurer did not
have an absolute right to severance. Although no specific guidelines were
suggested, the court emphasized that the trial judge had discretion to determine whether under all the circumstances of the particular case the
2
motion for severance should be granted.
Conflict on the issue of severance led to a split decision in Kratz v. Newsom, 29 in which the court upheld the denial of the insurer's motion for
severance. Two members of the court, believing in the continued strength
of former cases holding that knowledge of insurance might prejudice a jury,
would have granted severance.2 0 The two judges who voted to affirm felt
that Shingleton provided no absolute right to severance, since the insurer
was a proper party.3 1 Moreover, they emphasized that there was no showing
3 2
that the trial court abused its discretion in denying severance.
Although the instant decision concluded that the mention of policy
limits might be harmless under certain circumstances, 2 the court specifically

23.
24.
25.
26.

248 So. 2d 511 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1971).
Id. at 513.
Id.
Id. at 514.

27. 247 So. 2d 83 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1971). A strong dissent was filed stating that under
Shingleton and Beta Eta, absent extraordinary circumstances, the motion to sever should
be allowed. Id. at 85.

28. Id. at 84.
29. 251 So. 2d 539 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1971).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 539-40.

32. Id. Judge Robert Mann, who wrote the court's opinion, voted to affirm because
there was no showing of abuse of discretion. However, he stated that in future cases the
motion for severance should be granted unless some reason for the insurer's presence at
trial is shown by the plaintiff. Id. at 539.
33. 253 So. 2d at 422. The court said the mention of policy limits appears to be harmless where the limits are $100,000/$300,000; where there was disc injury with serious and
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rejected the notion that disclosure of policy limits should be made to the
jury.34 According to the court, one of the objectives of Beta Eta and Shingleton was to provide a disclosure of policy limits "between the parties" to
facilitate negotiations and encourage settlements. 35 Although contrary to
Zhe plain language of Shingleton, the court stated it never intended that
policy limits should go to the jury.36 Since the verdict must rest solely on the
evidence, the court reasoned that the amount of the policy is immaterial.
Moreover, allowing disclosure of the extent of the defendant's insurance
would equally entitle a defendant to mention it when the coverage is
minimal.
Although liability limits should not be disclosed at trial, the instant
court noted that in Beta Eta and Shingleton it was felt that revealing the
existence of an insurer as a real party in interest justifiably reflected financial responsibility.3 7 Knowledge of the existence of insurance offsets any
possible arguments characterizing the defendant as indigent when there is
an actual financial ability to respond.38 The court did not rely on the
language in Shingleton, which suggested that modern juries are more mature.39 Rather, the instant court emphasized that the insurance companies
are real parties in interest as they have a financial stake in the determination
of the case and usually bear the burden of defense costs.40 Indeed, it was
the insurance companies that had earlier urged they should be recognized
as real parties in interest.4 1 The court concluded that insurers, as real parties
in interest, should be disclosed and present when the case is tried.42 Thus,
the instant decision effects a compromise between Beta Eta and Shingleton
by allowing the jury to consider the existence, but not the extent, of insurance
coverage.
The instant court also approved Beta Eta's adaptation of rule 1.270 (b),
providing that a trial judge "may" grant severance. Absent a justiciable issue
relating to insurance, however, the court found no valid reason for severance. 43 Thus, the court rejected the notions that an insurer has an absolute

prolonged disability, traction and hospitalization; where the injuries were permanent; and
where the verdict returned was only for $19,000.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 423.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39.

See text accompanying notes 10-12 supra.

40. 253 So. 2d at 423.
41. See In re Rules Governing Conduct of Attorneys in Florida, 220 So. 2d 6 (Fla.
1969).

42. 253 So. 2d at 423.
43. Id. at 424. The court said there are some instances involving a question of coverage
when severance would be quite proper. However, absent a justiciable issue relating to
insurance, questions such as coverage, applicability of the insurance policy, interpretation
of the policy, or other such valid disputes on insurance coverage would not justify
severance. See also Godshall v. Unigard Ins. Co., 255 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 1971).
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right to severance 44 or that it must be affirmatively shown by the plaintiffs
that the matter of insurance is relevant to his cause of action.45 Emphasizing
the insurer's status as real party in interest, the court interpreted Shingleton as providing for severance of issues between the insured and the insurer,
6
not for severance of the trial on negligence liability.
The instant decision dearly established that the jury should be aware of
the existence of insurance coverage, and thus reconciled the law with the
realities of modern life. Since most states today have some form of mandatory
automobile insurance, juries are generally aware of the probability that defendants have insurance coverage. 47 Skillful attorneys have developed many
ways to indirectly inform juries of the existence of insurance. 48 Therefore,
the policy of nondisclosure may often fail to accomplish its purpose. Additionally, the instant decision advanced an affirmative reason for permitting
49
disclosure by recognizing that nondisclosure may prejudice the plaintiff.
In deciding that severance should not be granted unless there is some
valid dispute on the matter of insurance coverage, the instant case provides
a standard to guide the trial judge's discretion. The new standard, however,
is not without ambiguity. No rationale was offered for the standard adopted,
yet the court approved the Beta Eta adaptation of rule 1.270 (b) providing
that a trial judge may grant severance "in furtherance of convenience or to
avoid prejudice."' 50 Thus, the court may mean that a dispute involving insurance coverage might prejudice the jury or that it might be convenient
to sever such a dispute for a separate trial. If the court meant that severance
of issues relating to insurance would be more convenient, then the reasoning in Shingleton that the trial judge could sever unduly complicated issues
may still be applicable. However, if the court meant that litigation on the
issue of insurance coverage might result in prejudice, it at least impliedly
recognized that this degree of jury exposure to the fact of insurance could
be prejudicial to the insurer. Indeed, in both Louisiana and Wisconsin,
where the existence of insurance is admissible, decisions indicate that undue
emphasis on such evidence may be prejudicial to the defendant.6 '

44. See text accompanying notes 23-26 supra.
45. See Kratz v. Newsom, 251 So. 2d 539 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1971).
46. 253 So. 2d at 424. The court found the insurance carrier, as real party in interest,
is in "a position of continuing interest which includes the trial of the cause which the

third party has asserted against its insured."
47. Bussey v. Shingleton, 211 So. 2d 593, 596 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
48. Id.

49. See text accompanying note 38 supra. When the existence of insurance is not
known to the jury and the defendant is characterized as poor, juries may be prone to
return inadequate verdicts. See Note, Direct Action Against the Liability Insurer: A Legis-

lative Approach for Florida, 23 U. FLA. L. Rav. 304, 309 (1971).
50. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.270 (b).
51. See New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Harrington, 274 F.2d 323, 326 (5th Cir. 1960)
(dictum); Roeske v. Schmitt, 266 Wis. 557, 571-73, 64 N.W.2d 394, 401-03 (1954) (dictum).
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This factor may be significant, since the extent to which a plaintiff might
dwell on the existence of insurance is an unresolved question. If the standard
were based upon possible prejudice, this evidences an intent to insulate
the insurer at trial from possible prejudice flowing from actual litigation
over insurance coverage. More explicitly, the court stated "the presence of
financial responsibility .. .should be left apparent [without other express
mention, of course].",52 A plausible implication is that "other express mention" may still be grounds for a mistrial. Nevertheless, the intent of the
instant case is to effect a reasonable compromise between the interests of
the injured plaintiff and the insurer by allowing disclosure while minimizing
the risk of prejudice to the insurer.
WALLACE

52.

W.

TUDHOPE

253 So. 2d at 424.
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